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ABSTRACT 
In 2000, the Navy started the Individual Augmentation 
(IA) deployment program.  IA deployment provides a tool for 
military leaders to designate and assign specific 
individuals, not forces, to fill temporary duty jobs 
outlined by combatant commanders in support of National 
Command Authority (NCA) directed operations.   IA is one of 
the Navy’s means of contributing to the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
This thesis uses standard statistical modeling 
techniques to quantify the effects of IA deployments on Navy 
junior officer retention. Using these models we found that 
the odds of retention for junior officers who went on IA 
deployments were statistically significantly higher than for 
those officers that did not. This is an important result 
because Navy leaders have said that IA deployments will 
continue in the future.  Officers are the foundation of the 
Navy command and leadership structure; therefore, it is 
important to understand the effects these deployments have 
on their retention. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Previous research regarding the effects of deployments on 
U.S. military officer retention contradicted the common 
assumptions that increased number of deployments results in 
lower retention among U.S. military officers.  This research 
has shown that there is a positive association between 
increased number of deployments and military officer retention 
rates.  Findings also showed that military officers with 
higher numbers of hostile deployments showed higher retention 
rates than officers with the same amount of non-hostile 
deployment.  Hostile deployments for junior officers lessened 
the positive association between deployment and retention but 
did not eliminate it. 
Individual Augmentation (IA) deployment is a program 
started by the Navy in 2000.  It is a tool for the Navy to 
designate and assign specific individuals, not forces, to fill 
temporary duty jobs outlined by combatant commanders in 
support of National Command Authority directed operations. IA 
deployments started in response to the increased demand for 
Navy personnel to fill jobs related to operational commitments 
to the Global War on Terror and Operation Iraqi Freedom. IA 
deployments are assigned to specific individuals in contrast 
to the typical deployments that are assigned to units or 
ships.  This paper uses data collected from the Defense 
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) and the Bureau of Navy Personnel 
(BUPERS) to quantify the effects of IA deployments on Navy 
junior officer retention.  Consistent with the previous 
research regarding deployment effects on officer retention, we 
determined that there is a positive association between IA 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Effective Naval force planning requires an 
understanding of how various factors such as operational 
tempo (optempo), force demographics, and external economic 
conditions affect officer retention.  Officers are vital to 
the Navy’s command and leadership structure; therefore it is 
critical to understand how these factors affect officer 
retention.  Failure to understand these effects could result 
in a future officer corps incapable of meeting the Navy’s 
leadership needs. Individual Augmentation (IA) deployments, 
which started in 2000, may also affect officer retention.  
Because the IA program has been in use for such a short 
time, the Navy does not have an understanding as to how the 
program affects retention.  In order to effectively plan for 
future officer needs, it is important for the Navy to gain 
insight into the effect IA deployments have on officer 
retention.  This thesis quantifies the effects of IA 
deployments on Navy junior officer retention. This thesis 
also provides statistical evidence that there is a positive 
association between IA and junior officer retention.  That 
is, the odds of retention are higher for those officers who 
deploy on IA then for officers who do not.  
B. BACKGROUND 
The Navy’s “Total Force” policy calls for the 
“integration of both the Active and Reserve components into 
a seamless and cohesive force capable of meeting all 
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requirements in peacetime and in war.”(OPNAVINST 1001.21B)  
Recently, with limited resources and increased operational 
commitments, the Navy’s challenge is to ensure its force is 
adequately manned, trained, and equipped to respond to the 
full spectrum of military operations.  Under the “Total 
Force” policy the Navy tries to retain Active and Reserve 
forces and personnel capable of accomplishing assigned 
wartime mission tasking and capable of meeting peacetime 
contingency requirements. (OPNAVINST 1001.21B)  
Individual Augmentation is the Navy’s process of 
identifying and responding to combatant command mission-
related temporary duty personnel requirements. More 
specifically, IA provides a tool for the Navy to designate 
and assign specific individuals, not forces, to fill 
temporary duty jobs outlined by combatant commanders in 
support of National Command Authorities directed operations. 
(CJCS 1301.01B)  OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1001.24, dated 5 July 
2000, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
1301.01B, dated 1 July 2001 outline augmentation policies 
for the military. Recently, with increased optempo (measure 
of the pace of operations) and manning requirements 
experienced by the U.S. military, the IA process goal is to 
identify and fill the voids in mission-related manning 
within the military.  The IA process is also intended to 
provide manning to the Navy’s commitments in the Global War 
on Terror (GWOT) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). 
IA is designed to temporarily alleviate manning 
shortfalls for combatant commands which lack sufficient 
personnel to fill jobs specific to their mission tasking. It 
is not intended to be a long-term solution to fill permanent 
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manning shortages. (OPNAVINST 1001.24B) IA focuses on billet 
or job requirements rather than personnel requirements. The 
process is not intended to allocate more manpower to 
combatant commands just because they feel undermanned. 
Combatant commands determine and validate billet 
requirements to support specific mission tasking by the 
National Command Authority.  Navy component commands are 
tasked with providing the manpower necessary to fill the 
billets specified by the combatant commands.  In the event 
that the Navy Component command cannot fill the required 
billets, IA procedures are initiated by the Office of the 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) for Navy requirements, OPNAV 
(N31).   
The following outlines the procedures under OPNAV 
INSTRUCTION 1001.24 regarding IAs.  The procedures are 
broken down into five categories with corresponding 
subcategories. The specific procedures are as follows: 
1. Initial Tasking   
(a) Combatant commands are tasked directly by the 
National Command Authority.  They determine and validate the 
force requirement for the mission tasking, and task the Navy 
component command with identifying and assigning personnel 
to meet the force requirements.  It is the responsibility of 
the combatant commands to ensure the billet requirements are 
valid. (CJCS 1301.01B) 
(b) If the Navy component command cannot meet the 
personnel requirements as specified by the combatant 
command, OPNAV (N31), the Joint Staff (J-1) and the 
combatant command headquarters are informed. The Navy 
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component commander sends a request for augmentation.  The 
procedure specifies that Flag officer involvement in this 
process is vital.  Senior officers are required to validate 
the need for each billet requirement. There should be a 
specific billet that has been validated to support the use 
of IA. (OPNAVINST 1001.24B) 
2. Validation and Resource Assignment Process 
 (a) OPNAV (N31) reviews and validates requests for 
billet augmentations based on information forwarded by the 
Navy component command.  Additionally, the availability of 
resources is reviewed by both the active components (OPNAV 
(N12)) and reserve components (OPNAV (N095)) to identify the 
available personnel the Navy has to allocate to the IA 
process.  This process takes three days.  OPNAV (N31) then 
tasks either the active component or reserve component with 
the IA assignments. 
(b)  Without Presidential Reserve Call-Up Authority, 
OPNAV (N12) satisfies billet requirements with active duty 
volunteers, reserve volunteers, and if necessary active non-
volunteers.  Under PRC authority, OPNAV (N095) fills billets 
with volunteers, non-volunteers, or by reassignment of TAR 
personnel. 
3.  Identification of Sources Outside of Navy Assets 
Under special circumstances OPNAV (N12) may identify 
sources available for filling IAs external to the Navy.  The 
sources include other combatant commands, United States 
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) personnel, and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) personnel. 
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4. Personnel Extension Beyond Expected Rotation Date 
The combatant command reserves the right to extend IA 
deployments past their expected rotation date with 
concurrence from the Navy component command or Defense 
Agency.  Reservists on IA assignment under PRC may not be 
extended beyond a total of 270 days (mobilization and 
redeployment time included).  The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, resolves all objections to IA extensions. (CJCS 
1301.01B Encl A) 
5. Ongoing Operations 
Navy Component Commanders and OPNAV (N31, N12, and 
N095) are required to follow procedures for IA request, 
validation and sourcing identical to those discussed above. 
In the case of recurring requests for IA assignments over 12 
months, IA procedures recommend long-term sourcing via the 
Program Objective Memorandum Process (POM).  Simply put, IA 
procedures recommend that a permanent job position, rather 
than a temporary billet be created. (OPNAVINST 1001.24B)  
IA is not intended to increase peacetime manning, to 
fill permanent manning shortfalls, or to meet training 
requirements.  The goal of the deployment is to alleviate 
some of the stress on combat forces by filling the temporary 
duty support roles with Navy personnel.  Cross-checks, such 
as combatant commanders validating manning requirements and 
Flag level review at the component command level, are in 
place to prevent the misuse of the IA program.  All IA 
requests are submitted to the CNO.  OPNAV (N3/N5) is the 
final validation authority. (OPNAVINST 1001.24B) 
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Both active duty and reserve personnel may serve on IA 
assignments.  In January 2007 at the Surface Navy 
Association Conference, Rear Admiral Sonny Masso, head of 
Task Force Individual Augmentation (TFIA), stated that since 
2001, 82 percent of personnel serving on IA deployment have 
been from the reserve component.  Both officers and enlisted 
personnel serve on IAs.  The majority of the billets are 
located in the Middle East with most of those being in Iraq 
and Afghanistan; however, billets also include service in 
locations such as US Central Command, US European Command, 
Guantanamo Bay, and at commands within the Continental 
United States.  Personnel selected for IAs usually undergo 
training prior to deployment. There are two types of 
training.  Navy Individual Augmentation Combat Training is 
intended for all personnel assigned to an IA.  There is also 
theatre-specific training based on the missions and 
locations of the specific IA assignment. (Navy Newsstand 
2007) 
Force planning requires an awareness of the changing 
factors affecting Navy personnel.  Factors changing in the 
U.S. Navy include individual and unit deployment patterns, 
force demographics, and external economic conditions. 
Recently, the Navy deployment cycle has allowed for more 
flexibility in increasing deployment lengths; however, there 
is less uncertainty regarding when and where deployments 
will occur. According to Chief of Naval Personnel, Vice 
Admiral John C. Harvey, the Navy is trying to more 
effectively manage and track the amount of time individuals 
are deployed. (Navy Newsstand 2006) 
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Force demographics are also an important factor in 
force planning.  According to the CNO, diversity is a 
“strategic imperative” for the Navy. (Navy Newsstand 2006) 
Past research has proven that retention behaviors vary 
according to gender, race, and marital status among other 
demographic factors.  As demographic patterns change within 
the Navy, retention behavior will likely change also. 
C. OBJECTIVE 
Former CNO Admiral Mullen stated that IAs would 
continue to serve in support of combatant commands. In his 
March 2007 statement before the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense, Admiral Mullen 
stated that the IA program was “central to the Navy’s 
ability to sustain overall readiness, particularly in 
support of the Global War on Terror.”(Mullen 2007)  Admiral 
Mullen also stated:  
I see this as a long-term commitment by the Navy.  
I’m anxious to pitch in as much as we possibly 
can, for the duration of this war. Not only can 
we do our share, but [we can] take as much stress 
off those who are deploying back-to-back, home 
one year, deployed one year and now are on their 
third or fourth deployment. (Navy Newsstand 2007) 
Given that IA deployments will continue for the 
foreseeable future, it is important to assess whether they 
are having an effect on officer retention.  There may be 
reason to believe that there exists a negative association 
between IA and officer retention. IA deployment often 
removes officers from shore billets and deploys them to 
combat zones.  IA deployment is similar to conventional Navy 
deployment in that it often requires servicemen to be away 
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from their home ports or duty station for extended periods 
of time.  However, the IA process is different in that it is 
not part of the detailing process and is not specifically 
outlined within a serviceman’s career path.  It is also 
different in that officers deploy individually, not as part 
of a unit.  An officer on IA assignment, which we will refer 
to as an “IA”, may also deploy to serve with another 
service.  IAs often receive very little notice prior to 
being assigned; therefore, cannot plan IA assignments in 
their career path.   The IA process will in the future be 
part of the typical detailing process and therefore will be 
able to be better incorporated in a service member’s career 
path.   
There are advantages to conventional Navy deployment 
that are also typical to IA deployments.  Military pay 
incentives help entice some serviceman to opt for overseas 
deployments, often to combat zones.  Service members receive 
tax advantages while in combat zones and also receive Family 
Separation Allowance (FSA) while deployed away from their 
families more than 30 days.   Military personnel deployed to 
hostile or combat zones receive Imminent Danger Pay. All 
result in an increase in pay. 
Previous research regarding the effects of perstempo on 
officer retention showed that increased deployment activity 
had a positive association with officer retention rates.   
Additional findings were that officers with higher numbers 
of hostile deployments had, on average, higher retention 
rates than officers with the same numbers of non-hostile 
deployments.  Both findings contradicted the common 
 9
assumption that increased deployment results in lower 
retention rates. (Fricker 2002)  
This thesis quantifies the effects of Individual 
Augmentation deployment on Navy junior officer retention.  
Our goal is to confirm or contradict the common assumption 
that IA deployment causes lower retention.  Additionally, we 
evaluate demographic, family status, and job-related factors 
to determine if any such factors can be associated with an 
officer’s retention behavior.  We gathered data on officers 
who deployed on IA assignment and compared it to data on 
officers who deployed on conventional deployments.  A 
descriptive analysis of IA deployments was conducted and 
models were fit to assess the impact of IA deployments on 
retention. 
D. ORGANIZATION 
This paper is organized as follows. Chapter II 
describes the data and the data sources.  It also explains 
what information was unavailable but would have been useful 
for our research.  Chapter III describes the methods used to 
evaluate officer retention decisions. It also explains the 
statistical test used to quantify the effects of IA on 
officer retention.  Chapter IV provides the results of the 
statistical tests and Chapter V provides the conclusions and 
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II. THE DATA 
A.  DATA SOURCE 
We collected IA deployment information from 2001 to 
2007 for 15,000 Navy enlisted personnel and officers from 
the Bureau of Navy Personnel (BUPERS). Among the 15,000 IAS 
were 4,038 officers. Social Security Numbers (SSN’s) were 
used to uniquely identify each officer.  BUPERS provided 
rank, Navy Officer Designation Codes (DESIG’s), Navy Officer 
Billet Codes (NOBC’s) and information on the specific IA 
assignment such as deployment dates, deployment length, 
deployment location, allocated training time prior to 
deployment, and job description codes.  
The Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) provided data 
on 98,708 Navy officers within its database from September 
1997 to September 2007. This data included demographic 
information, education history, commissioning source, pay 
data, family status information, discharge and retention 
information, and other information specific to each 
individual’s military service. The DMDC data also identified 
officers by SSN.  
The data from the BUPERS was matched with the 
information from DMDC using SSN to link personnel data to IA 
deployment data. The final product was a database with 
information on 98,708 officers of whom 4,038 had been 
deployed on an IA assignment.   
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B.  RANK, DESIG’S AND NOBC’S 
Rank, DESIG’s and NOBC’s were used to identify each 
officer and associate each officer to specific warfare or 
job specialties.  These are the typical ways in which the 
Navy divides its officers.  Pay data and time in service are 
also associated with an officer’s rank and job specialty. In 
general, the longer an officer has been in the Navy the 
higher his or her pay and rank. The officer ranks in the 
data were Warrant Officers (WO’s) and Commissioned Officers 
(O-1 through O-6).   
In Table 1, the 4,038 IAs are compared to the 94,670 
Non-IAs by rank. Personnel who deploy on IA assignments are 
referred to as IAs. The table divides the officers by rank 
and by whether or not the officers were deployed on an IA 
assignment.  Of the 4,038 officers who deployed on IA, 86.6% 
were O-3’s, O-4’s and O-5’s.  These same ranks made up 71.1% 
of the 94,670 Non-IAs.   
   
 IA 
Rank No Yes 
WO's   3.7% 2.2%
O-1    7.8% 1.3%




O-6  8.7% 4.8%
Table 1. Percentage of IAs and Non-IAs by Rank 
DESIG’s are four-digit numeric codes used to identify 
an officer’s warfare community or primary job. Officers are 
assigned to specific warfare communities based on selection 
processes and completed training qualifications.  Two 
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officers in the same warfare community may have slightly 
different designator codes because the codes also identify 
whether an officer is active duty or a reservist and whether 
and officer is an Unrestricted Line Officer (URL), 
Restricted Line (RL) or Limited Duty Officer (LDO).  
Officers were divided into five job categories: “Aviation,” 
“Surface Warfare,” “Submarine Warfare,” “Supply Corps” and 
“Other.” Each job category included the URL’s, RL’s, LDO’s, 
active duty and reservist within the warfare community. 
“Other” included all officer jobs not covered by the other 
categories including Staff Corps, Restricted Line (other 
than Supply), and undesignated officers.     
DESIG’s were unavailable for 17,696 officers in the 
data.  For these officers NOBC’s were used to classify their 
job communities.  NOBC’s are also four-digit codes; however, 
they identify an officer’s specialty by way of job 
experience rather than warfare community. NOBC’s identify 
officer job requirements and officer occupational experience 
acquired through job experience or through a combination of 
education and job experience. It was more difficult to 
classify officers into the five warfare communities using 
NOBC’s because the job descriptions rarely included any 
keywords that specified the warfare community the job 
supported.  For the cases where the community an officer 
belonged to was obvious, we classified the officer into the 
appropriate warfare community.  Officers who lacked DESIG’s 
and whose NOBC’s did not lead to an obvious classification 
were placed into the “Other” category.   
Table 2 compares the IAs and Non-IAs by warfare 
communities.  The table displays the percentage of officers 
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from each warfare community by IA status. Of the 4038 
officers who deployed on IAs, nearly half of them were 
classified as “Other.”  This seems reasonable since the same 
holds true for the Non-IA officers. 
 
 IA 






Table 2. Percentage of IAs and Non-IAs by Warfare Community  
C.  DEPLOYMENT LOCATIONS, TRAINING TIME, DEPLOYMENT DATES  
BUPERS provided duty locations for the IA assignments.   
Deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan accounted for 58 percent 
of IA assignments.  Other locations included Africa, United 
Arab Emirates, Kuwait, South America, Germany, and Saudi 
Arabia. Figure 1 displays the number IAs assigned to the 



























































Figure 1.   Number of Officers per IA Deployment 
Locations 
Training time was the time allotted for training on IA 
prior to arriving in theatre. In some cases officer received 
no training prior to being deployed to the IA duty location.  
The average training time was 34 days and the maximum time 
was 300 days.  An error in the data claims that one 
particular officer received -24 days of training prior to 
going on IA assignment.  This is clearly an error and must 
be noted prior to any analysis results. We left the error in 
the data. 
TAD provided how long an officer was on IA assignment.   
The mean IA deployment length was 232 days and the median 
time was 179 days. The longest IA deployment lasted 730 
days. Two officers on IA assignment were reported to have 
spent zero or fewer days on IA assignment.   
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D. PAY ENTRY BASE DATE, DATE OF ENTRY TO THE OFFICER 
RANKS AND TIME IN SERVICE 
Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD) and Date of Entry to the 
Officer Ranks (DOLE) are two dates provided in the data.  
PEBD is the date a service member begins military service.  
This date is used for accounting purposes and years of total 
service are calculated with this start date.   DOLE is the 
date an officer was commissioned. In about half of the 
cases, PEBD and DOLE were identical for officers.  However, 
some officers served in the enlisted ranks prior to being 
commissioned.  In the cases which the PEBD was prior to the 
DOLE, the PEBD was the date a service member entered the 
Navy as an enlistee and the DOLE was the date the service 
member received a commission as an officer.  
Time in service is the time an officer has served in 
the military.  Time in service was set to the amount of time 
between DOLE and the loss date, if the officer was no longer 
in military service. For officers still in military service 
in September 2007, time in service was set to the amount of 
time between DOLE and September 2007. If an officer was 
prior enlisted, then service time was set to the time 
between the PEBD and the loss date or September 2007.  Some 
officers in the data have fewer than six months of enlisted 
service prior to joining the officer ranks.  In these cases 
we assume that the enlisted time was associated with an 
officer commissioning program.  However, if an officer spent 
more than six months in the enlisted ranks, we presumed the 
officer was enlisted prior to becoming an officer.  Finally, 
Warrant officers provide another special case.  Warrant 
officers spend many years in the enlisted ranks prior to 
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becoming officers.  In the case of Warrant Officers the PEBD 
is many years before the DOLE.  Therefore the time in 
service for warrant officers is often much greater than that 
of commissioned officers.  
E.  DEMOGRAPHIC DATA 
DMDC provided demographic information on all officers.  
This data included age, gender, ethnic group, educations 
level, commissioning source and family status.  Family 
status was divided into four groups: Joint marriage, 
Married, Single without family, and Single with family.  
Joint marriage described officers who had a spouse also in 
military service.  Single without family described unmarried 
officers with no dependents.  Single with family described 
unmarried officers with dependents.   
Table 3 displays the percentages of IAs and Non-IAs by 
gender.  According to the data, males were slightly more 
likely to be given IA assignments than were females.  Table 
4 displays the percentage of IAs and Non-IAs by family 
status.  There was very little difference in the percentages 
between IAs and Non-IAs based on family status. 
      
 IA 
Gender No Yes 
Male 84.1% 87.1%
Female 15.9% 12.9%









Family Status No Yes 
Joint  3.1%   3.2%
Married 67.3%  68.7%
Single(w/family   6.7%    5.5%
Single(w/o family) 22.9% 22.6%
Table 4. Percentage IAs and Non-IAs by Family Status 
 
F.  LOSS DATA 
DMDC provided loss dates and loss codes for officers 
who resigned from military service between September 1997 
and September 2007. Loss codes provided reasons that the 
officer left military service.  DMDC provided a number of 
different loss codes; however, the major reasons for leaving 
military service were end of service obligations, medical 
reasons, or that the military forced the officer to resign. 
Loss codes were missing for many officers in the data. Of 
the 4,038 officer deployed on IAs, 639 are no longer in 
military service.  Of the 94,670 of the officers not 
deployed on IA, 44,806 are no longer in military service.  
G.  UNAVAILABLE DATA 
Unavailable data that would be useful are the 
obligation times for officer commitments. For URL officers 
(officers who have combat specialties) with the exception of 
naval aviators and naval flight officers, the initial 
contract obligation after commissioning is five years.  For 
aviators and flight officers, the initial obligation is 
seven to eight years after completing flight training.  
After the initial obligation, an officer may choose to sign 
another obligation contract.  These contracts lengths vary 
in the different officer communities.  For RL officers and 
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Staff officers the initial and subsequent contract lengths 
vary throughout the communities.  Some of this information 
is available on the Naval Personnel Command website 
(www.bupers.navy.mil). This data would be useful to 
determine the times within a career at which an officer had 
to decide whether he or she would remain in military 
service. 
The date an officer was initially assigned to an IA 
deployment would also be useful data.  This time could be 
compared to the decision time discussed above.  An officer 
has to give the Navy advanced notice, usually about a year, 
prior to resigning his or her commission.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that often an officer is assigned to an IA 
only after the Navy receives his or her notice of intent to 
resign.  This is not the cause and effect relationship we 
care about.  Instead we want to determine whether an IA 
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III. MODELING THE EFFECTS OF IAS ON JUNIOR OFFICER 
RETENTION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the development and use of the 
model used to quantify the effects of IA deployments on 
junior officer retention.  The first sections in this 
chapter describe the development of the model and rules used 
to create a subset of the officer data that could be used to 
address the problem.  The remaining sections of this chapter 
describe the statistical tools used to quantify the effects 
of IA on retention. 
Fricker (2002) notes that it is difficult to use raw 
trends in data to determine the effects of deployments on 
retention.  There are many reasons an officer may choose to 
stay or leave and just observing raw trends may not provide 
any real answers to deployment effects. 
B.  THE MODEL 
We created a model similar to that of Fricker (2002) 
for addressing the effects of deployment on junior officers. 
Modifications were made to the model Fricker used to make 
our model more specifically relevant strictly to Navy junior 
officers.  In our model, Surface, Submarine, and Supply 
officers were grouped together separate from Aviators, 
because aviators are bound to different service contract 
obligations than other junior officers.  The differences in 
the obligations required us to model the Aviators slightly 
differently from members of the other officer communities.  
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1. Surface, Submarine and Supply 
The initial service contract for junior officers 
commissioned in these warfare communities is five years.  
Officers may choose to resign their commission after five 
years or choose to sign additional service obligation 
contracts after the initial five years has ended.  For some 
of the communities, there are specific pay incentives for 
signing such contracts.  Other officers continue service 
without signing contracts.  This allows them an additional 
18 to 24 months of service prior to having to make the 
decision of whether to continue or resign.   These officers 
make the decision around the 6.5 years time-in-service 
point.  Figure 2 is a graphic taken from the Surface Warfare 
Junior Officer Community Brief from January 2008.  It is a 
timeline of a typical junior officer career path in the 
Surface Warfare community.  The timeline for junior officers 
in the Submarine and Supply Communities differ only 
slightly. Figure 3 is a similar table we created for a 
Submarine junior officer career path.   
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0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 
WARFARE  TRAINING SEA TOUR SHORE TOUR   DH SEA TOUR 
Figure 3.   Submarine Officer Career Timeline (Source: 
author) 
To assess the affects of IA deployments on Surface, 
Submarine and Supply Junior officers we examine officers at 
the seven-year time-in-service point. We chose seven years 
to allow sufficient time after the expiration of the initial 
service contract obligation to as accurately as possible 
determine whether an officer left military service.  We 
declare that a Surface, Submarine or Supply junior officer 
still in the Navy after seven years time-in-service has 
decided to remain in the Navy.  Junior officers not present 
at seven years of service have left the Navy. Junior 
officers who decide to resign after the initial five-year 
service contracts were accounted for because they would have 
resigned prior to seven years.  We believed that the seven-
year time-in-service provided a good point in the career to 
prevent inaccurately determining an officer’s decision to 
remain or resign.  Figure 4 is a simplified version of the 
junior officer career timeline and it incorporates the 






0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 
INITIAL SERVICE OBLIGATION OPTIONAL  SERVICE STILL IN?(YES/NO)
Figure 4.   General Timeline used for Surface, Sub and 
Supply Officers  
 
2. Aviators 
We model the retention habits of Naval Aviators 
similarly to that of the Surface, Submarine and Supply 
officers; however, we changed the decision point to ten 
years instead of seven years because of the difference in 
the service obligation time.  The initial service contract 
for aviators is approximately seven years after being 
certified.  Additionally, it takes on average two years to 
become qualified as pilot.  Ten years is approximately one 
year after the end of the initial service contract 
obligation.  The career path timeline for aviators is 
dependent on the specific aviation platform to which an 
officer is assigned.  Helicopter pilots have different 
training requirements than fixed-wing pilots which results 
in some differences in the career path timeline.  Figure 5 
shows the typical career path of a junior officer aviator 
based on verbal discussions with actual Naval Aviator junior 
officers.  Figure 6 is a simplified version of the career 
timeline for aviators and incorporates the ten-year decision 
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PILOT TRAINING SEA TOUR SHORE TOUR   SEA TOUR
Figure 5.   Naval Aviator Career Path Timeline 
 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.56 6.57 7.58 8.5 9 9.5 10 
INITIAL OBLIGATION OPTIONAL SERVICE STILL IN?
Figure 6.   General Timeline used for Naval Aviator 
C. MODEL COVARIATES 
In addition to IA deployments, we incorporated other 
factors that affect retention behavior.  These factors 
included gender, race, family status (whether the officer 
was married or single and whether or not he or she had 
children), and DESIG. 
D. DATA CENSORING 
The IA program started in 2000; therefore, the officers 
we are interested in are those officers who could have gone 
on IA as junior officers.   We removed from the data those 
officers who would not provide insight into the problem. 
Because our goal is to quantify the effects of IA on junior 
officers, we removed all WO’s, mid-grade and senior officers 
from the data.  We also removed officers who were not in the 
Navy when the IA program was active. Officers with prior 
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enlisted service were removed because their retention time 
points and decisions were presumed to be different.  The 
subset of officers remaining was the group of junior 
officers with no other Navy experience other than their time 
as a JO.  Additionally, these junior officers were in the 
Navy during the time in which the possibility existed for 
them to be selected for an IA assignment. 
E. GENERAL RULES 
We started with the initial database of 98,708 
officers.  Restrictions were applied to the officer data to 
create a subset that included only the officers who could 
provide insight to the problem. The final subset included 
only officers who could have gone on IA as junior officers.  
The following rules were applied to the original data to 
create the subset of officers for our problem. 
 
1. WO’s were removed from the data. 
 
2. DOLE was used rather than PEBD as the beginning of 
service date.  The time in service was set to time 
between DOLE and Loss Date. If the officer was not lost 
then the time in service was set to the time between 
DOLE and September 2007. 
 
3. Officers with more than six months between PEBD 
and DOLE were assumed to be prior enlisted and 
therefore not included in the model.  Prior enlisted 
officers have Navy experience other than their time as 
a JO which may affect retention decision. 
 
3. Officers with fewer than six months between PEBD 
and DOLE were assumed to have not been prior enlisted 
and were included in the model.   
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4. Only officers who joined the Navy in 1995 or later 
remained in the data.  These officers are junior 
officers during the time the IA program was in effect. 
 
5. Surface, Submarine, and Supply officers who 
entered the Navy after 2001 were removed from the data 
because they have not yet reached the seven-year 
decision point necessary to determine whether they were 
retained. 
 
6. Aviators who entered the Navy after 1998 were 
removed from the data because they have not yet reached 
the ten-year decision point necessary to determine 
whether they were retained. 
 
The final subset included 17,887 officers who were 
junior officers during the time the IA program was in 
effect.  The possibility existed for each of these officers 
to be assigned to an IA. Of this set of 17,887 officers 
vulnerable to IA assignment, 911 officers were actually 
assigned to an IA.  Table 5 divides officers by whether they 
were assigned to an IA assignment and whether they were lost 
or retained in the Navy.  Retained officers were Surface, 
Sub, and Supply officers still in the data after seven years 
and Aviators still in the data after ten years.  Officers 
not present in the data after these years were considered a 
loss.  
 
 Loss Retained Total %Retained
IA 310 601 911 66% 
Non-IA 9659 7317 16,976 43% 
Total 9969 7918 17,887 44% 
Table 5. Retention of IA and non-IA officers 
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F. ANALYSIS METHODS 
1. Chi-squared Test 
A Chi-squared test was performed to compare the loss 
rates of IAs to non-IAs.  The Chi-squared test for 
independence tests for statistically significant differences 
between the IA and non-IAs with regard to their retention 
behavior.  The test will evaluate whether there exists an 
association between IA and Navy junior officer retention. 
Because our data includes all officers who were deployed on 
IA assignment, we view the data as a random sample from a 
hypothetical population of Navy officers.  Any statistically 
significant differences we observe would mean that we have 
observed differences bigger than we would expect in other 
random samples from our hypothetical population. The 
hypothesis tested is: 
 
Ho: IA is not associated with retention. 
Ha: Not Ho. 
 








































The Chi-squared statistic was used to evaluate the 
association between IA and junior officer retention. 
2. Logistic Regression 
As in Fricker’s (2002) model for assessing deployment 
effects on military junior officer retention, logistic 
regression is the modeling technique that was used to model 
Navy JO retention.  Logistic regression is a standard 
statistical modeling tool used to estimate the probability 
of a binary event’s occurrence.  In our model we use 
logistic regression to quantify the effects of many factors 
including gender, race, family status, DESIG’s, and IA on 
junior officer retention.  The basic form of the model is 
0 1 1log( /1 ) ... n np p x xβ β β− = + + +  
where p is the loss probability that a junior officer will 
leave prior to seven years (ten years for Aviators). p/(1-p) 
is the odds ratio and β’s represent the change in log odds 
for a unit change in X.  The X’s represent the various 
factors in our model such as gender, race, family status, 
DESIG’s and IA.  Log odds are assumed to be a linear 
function of the covariates. 
The model identifies what factors, including IA, have 
an effect on junior officer retention.  The model also 
quantifies how changes to the factors will affect officer 
retention.  Chapter IV summarizes the results from our 























IV. THE EFFECTS OF IA ON RETENTION 
 This chapter quantifies the effects of IA on Navy 
junior officer retention.  We present our findings and 
discuss the overall trends in the data.  The results of our 
statistical analysis represent the findings from the 17,887 
junior officers in our data during the time IA was in use. 
Our results are discussed in terms of statistical 
significance. 
A. THE SELECTION OF IAS 
Prior to discussing the results from our statistical 
test we compare the populations of IA and non-IA officers by 
gender, DESIG, race, and family status.  We think that there 
exists some bias in the Navy’s selection process for IAs; 
however, with the current data we are unable to observe some 
of this potential bias.  The Navy also accepts volunteers 
for IA so any bias we observe might be a result of differing 
demographics among people who volunteer for IA.  It might be 
the case that the Navy attempts to select officers it thinks 
will stay in beyond the initial service contract obligation 
for IA. In the tables below we compare the percentages of IA 
officers to non-IA officers by gender, race, family status, 
DESIG, to observe any bias in Navy selection of IAs.  
Tables 6,7,8 and 9 show the proportions of IAs and non-
IAs by gender, DESIG’s, race and family status within the 
subset of 17,887 junior officers who were in the Navy during 
the time IA was in use.  By category, the proportion of 
officers assigned to IA is similar to the proportion of 
those not assigned to IA. We do observe some differences.  
 32
Male officers make up 85.8 percent of the IA officers but 
only 78.6 percent of the non-IA officers.  Officers 
classified as “other” make up 45.2 percent of IAs and 49 
percent of non-IAs.  There appears to be a difference 
between those officers selected (or volunteering) for IA 
when compared by gender and family status.  There appears to 
be no substantial difference between those officers selected 
(or volunteering) for IA assignment when compared by DESIG 































Joint Marriage 3.5% 4.5%
Married 63.8% 60.7%
Single w/ dependents 4.7% 7.8%
Single w/o dependents 28.0% 26.9%
Table 9.  IA and non-IA officers by Family Status 
  
B. IA EFFECTS ON JUNIOR OFFICER RETENTION 
1. Chi-Squared Test Results  
As displayed in Table 5 in Chapter III, 66 percent of 
the IA officers remained in the Navy after their initial 
service contract obligation. However, only 43 percent of the 
non-IA officers remained in the Navy after the initial 
service obligation. The data strongly suggests that IAs are 
more likely to stay in the Navy beyond their initial 
obligation than non-IAs.  This positive association between 
IA and retention contradicts the perception that IA leads to 
lower retention for junior officers.  The Chi-squared test 
rejected the hypothesis that officer losses were independent 
of IA. The calculated Chi-squared statistic was 182.36 with 
1 degree of freedom and a p-value of 0.  
2. Logistic Regression without Covariates 
The result from our regression model without covariates 
was consistent with the previous results from the Chi-
squared test. At an alpha of .05, IA is a significant factor 
in evaluating the odds an officer will remain in the Navy.  
Additionally, the results from the logistic regression 
showed a positive association between IA deployments and 
junior officer staying in the Navy. Table 11 displays the 
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factor, log odds value, standard error, and t statistic from 
the logistic regression model without covariates.  
The positive association between IA and retention 
contradicts the notion that IA leads to lower retention. 
From the log odds ( β ), we quantify using eβ  the effect IA 
deployments has on junior officer retention.  If an officer 
deployed on IA assignment, the odds of retention were 60 
( .469 1.60e = ) percent higher than for an otherwise similar non-
IA officer.  
 
Factor Log odds (β) Std Error t value 
(Intercept) 0.192 0.035 5.37 
IA 0.469 0.036 13.125 
Table 10. The effects of IA on Navy junior officer retention 
excluding model covariates. 
 
This result does not consider the contribution of other 
factors that may affect officer retention.  As stated in 
Chapter I, previous research has proven that there are many 
factors that affect an individual’s decision to remain in 
the Navy or separate.  The next section shows logistic 
regression results where covariates, to examine other 
factors that may affect officer retention, are included. 
3. Logistic Regression with Covariates 
Adding covariates to the model led to results 
consistent with the Chi-squared test and the model excluding 
covariates. IA remained a statistically significant factor 
associated with increased junior officer retention in the 
presence of the other factors.  As observed in the model 
excluding covariates, there was a positive association 
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between IA and junior officer retention. The positive 
association between IA and retention increased when 
covariates were included.  Based on the log odds value of 
.944, if an officer deployed on an IA, the odds of retention 
were 157 percent higher than for a similar non-IA officer. 
 
 Log odds (β) Std. error t value 
(Intercept) -0.235 0.146  -1.61 
Gender -0.356 0.042  -8.47 
White  0.286  0.119  2.39 
Black  0.585  0.132  4.41 
Hispanic  0.392  0.132  2.96 
Indian  0.441  0.197  2.23 
Asian  0.326  0.134  2.43 
Other  0.549  0.208  2.64 
Married -0.176 0.077       -2.28 
Single w/dep -1.243 0.096      -12.98 
Single w/o dep -1.154 0.080      -14.39 
DesigOther  0.235  0.046  5.14 
DesigSub  0.171  0.072  2.36 
DesigSupply  0.573  0.077  7.44 
DesigSurface  0.231  0.052  4.47 
IA  0.944  0.074       12.74 
Table 11. IA effects with covariates 
 
 According to the statistical test performed, the odds 
of retention for junior officers who deployed on IA 
assignment were higher than for officers not deployed on IA.  
In Chapter V, we discuss our conclusions and identify areas 


























With the results from our statistical test we are able 
to contradict the general assumption as it applies to junior 
officers that IA leads to lower retention rates.  In fact, 
we see that the odds of retention are higher for officers 
who go on IA deployments.  This is an important conclusion 
for Navy manpower decision-makers.  IA deployments do not 
appear to result in higher junior officer loss rates.  
According to our results, decision makers can continue to 
use IA deployments to fill Combatant Command mission related 
temporary duty assignments without decreasing the odds of 
retention for the selected officers. 
It is unlikely that the cause and effect relationship 
is as simple as the IA deployments make officers want to 
stay in the Navy.  We think it is more likely that the 
officers who volunteer or get selected for IAs are more 
inclined to stay in the Navy in any case.  Unfortunately, we 
did not have information on when officers made the decision 
to stay in the Navy or get out. Our results simply show odds 
of retention are higher for IA officers. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that IA assignments are 
often given to officers who have informed the Navy of their 
intention to leave.  Because we did not have information 
describing when officers made the decision to stay or leave, 
we could not account for this scenario.  We think it is 
unlikely that an officer who has decided to leave the Navy 
and then is assigned to an IA will change his or her mind 
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and stay.  However, due to pay incentives there may be such 
cases.  Our research has simply quantified the association 
between IA and junior officer retention.  If the Navy wants 
to know if IA deployments influence officer decisions to 
stay in the Navy, it should simply ask.  Surveying the 
population of officers who go on IA deployments and simply 
asking these officers whether the IA assignment affected 
their decision to stay in or leave the Navy would help 
answer this question. 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The effects of IA deployments on Navy enlisted 
personnel and mid-grade officers should be quantified.  
Enlisted personnel make up the majority of Navy personnel 
and mid-grade officers make up over 28 percent of the 
officers given IA assignments so it is important to 
understand how IA affects their retention.   
Because the IA deployments started in 2000, we had a 
limited set of officers to observe.  The relationship 
between IA and retention should be determined again in the 
future after more officers experience IA deployments.  
According to Admiral Masso, the Navy is committed to IA 
deployments.  Therefore it is important to continue to 
monitor the retention rates of personnel who deploy on IA 
assignments.  
From our results, IA appears to have a positive impact 
on junior officer retention.  A survey would be a good 
method of gathering useful information on the population of 
IAs. It could pose questions on whether IA deployments 
affected individual’s decisions to stay in the Navy and how 
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their decisions were affected.  This would give the Navy a 
better understanding of how IA affects its personnel.  A 
survey could better identify possible cause and effect 
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